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To this list must be added one further objective since agriculture has not been excepted from the general aims of the EEC Treaty which noted in Art. 110 that "by establishing a customs union between themselves the Member States intend to contribute, in conformity with the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international exchanges and the lowering of customs barriers". A comparison of the various objectives of agricultural policy shows that some of them are not easily compatible. This is especially true of the objectives with an internal economic bent on the one hand and the aim of developing and liberalizing world trade on the other. Conflicts between diverging objectives are thus practically built-in in the policy. Internal intervention systems and flexible measu~,es of external protection are operated for this purpose. The system may be illustrated by the arrangements for wheat as shown diagramatically in Figure 1 .
The guide price ( supply. In the case of grains this is the price in Duisburg because this is the area which has to draw on other regions for the largest amount of grains. In addition, an intervention price is fixed in order to keep the actual market price as determined by supply and demand from falling too far below the desired guide price. If the price reaches the intervention level, the intervention authorities start buying and thereby withdraw supplies from the market. In consequence the market price cannot drop below the intervention price which is thus a guaranteed minimum price. The intervention prices are seasonally graded so as to offer an inducement to farmers to undertake the storage of the harvested grains. All major market organizations do in practice provide for withdrawal of supplies from the market through intervention. At times of heavy overproduction putting a strain on limited storage facilities it is possible to curtail the obligatory intervention purchases by very strict interpre;cation of the quality stipulations". A special problem arises in the intra-EC trade in agricultural products because the prices are tied to the common European Unit of Account (EUA) . This caused no difficulties so long as the member states did not have to change their exchange rate parities. However, when some countries devalued in 1969, the farmers in these countries benefited from a depreciation-induced rise of the producer prices paid to them while those in countries whose currencies had been upvalued had to cope with lower prices. This hit the West German farmers especially hard; compensatory payments were therefore made to them (1) in % of (2) for four years in succession. Moreover, "Monetary Compensatory Amounts" were introduced in order to eliminate the price differences between member states for products subject to fixed prices S.
Figure 1 Levy and Refund Arrangements for Wheat
The EC guide prices for agricultural products are as a rule much higher than the corresponding world market prices. Table 1 shows the EC import prices for several products compared with their prices in the world market.
To maintain the high level of the guide prices the internal market of the EC has to be screened from the world market. Threshold prices are derived from the guide prices for this purpose. These threshold prices are somewhat lower than the guide prices. In the case of grains it is assumed that the imports can be offered in the principal short-supply area -Duisburg -at the guide prices. The threshold prices are the basis for calculating the variable import levies to be imposed in order to close the gap between the cif import price and the threshold price. The levy system allows of flexible adjustment to changing world market conditions as the EC Commission is free to adjust the levy ratedepending on the particular market organizationdaily (e. g. for grains or sugar), weekly, monthly or quarterly s.
The sugar market organization provides for a variable export levy as well as an import levy. Variable export levies may however also be imposed under all the other market organizations by virtue of special safeguard clauses. This had to be done in respect of a few products during 1973-75 when the EC price was below the world market level. Exports were even for a while put under an embargo in order to forestall shortages inside the EC 7. Normally however this does not happen. Table 1 shows that since 1975/76 the EC import prices of the selected products have been above their world market prices, and in most cases the margin has been widening constantly.
As a result of the high guaranteed prices various products are in the EC in surplus production. In 1978 the EC was self-sufficient for instance in pigmeat (100 % of requirements), poultry (103 %), butter (119 %), skimmed milk powder (107 %) and cheese (108%) 8 . EC surplus outputs which are not denaturalized or given away have to be disposed of in the world market. Given the existing price structure this means in most cases that the exports must be subsidized. The requisite export refunds are calculated in like manner as the variable levies.
In addition to the system of variable levies, various formalities act as an impediment on imports and exports of agricultural products. Licences are obligatory for imports and exports under the market organizations; they serve the purpose of enhancing the market transparence and the surveillance of product movements. The licences entitle and obligate the holder to import or export a certain product quantity, as applied for, during the validity of the licence; bonds to be deposited at the time of issue are forfeited if the licence is not used. For imports proof of the country Of origin is required. Embedded in all market organizations are safeguards which can be invoked if imports or exports threaten to cause serious market disruptions. The measures available to the Commission in such a situation range all the way, right up to suspension of imports and exports 9.
Obstacles to Imports into the EC
It is true that imports of agricultural products into the EC are in principle not subject to quantitative restrictions because these would in the given circumstances be incompatible with GATT. EC countries wishing to import such products have however to cope not only with the cost burden of the levies but with miscellaneous problems which may in many cases well have serious consequences, especially for developing countries:
[] A good deal of practical experience and of flexibility is needed for dealings with the EC bureaucracy, and many marketing agencies in developing countries have 0nly a limited store of these. The grain and sugar levies for instance are fixed daily by the customs authorities, so that foreign suppliers have to adapt to new prices all the time 1~
[] In phases of increasing surplus production the import licences are an important instrument for the H.E. Buchholz, op. cit., p. 92.
lo The need for an immediate response is reduced slightly by the provision in most market organizations that the risk of levy changes can be covered for some time ahead by means of advance fixing.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE HWWA-INSTITUT FOR WlRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG-HAMBURG
Wolfgang Schaft [] As the calculation of the import levies is based on the cif import price of the lowest representative world market quotation, higher-priced supplies from third countries must necessarily be offered in the EC at prices above the guide price ~2.
INTERNATIONAL BANKS
[] Finally, countries exporting to the EC can never be certain that the EC Commission will not put the "safeguard clause" in force and bring imports to a halt if it deems one of the objectives of Art. 39 of the EEC Treaty to be in jeopardy. The EC Commission may even go so far as to infringe its treaty undertakings towards third countries. This happened for instance in dealings with Latin American countries which -not least because of definite take-up commitments by the EC -considerably enlarged their beef production and were later hit by an import stop on beef 13.
Special Arrangements for Developing Countries
No consideration has so far been given to the various agreements between the EC and developing countries by virtue of which EC imports from the latter receive preferential treatment. Among such agreements are those with the former colonial territories of EC member states (the first and second Yaounde agreement, the Arusha agreement, the Lom6 conventions, the partial association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco, the association agreements with Mediterranean .states (Greece, Turkey, Malta) and the preference agreements with Mediterranean states (Spain, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria). Besides, a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in favour of imports from developing countries was put in operation by the EC on July 1, 1971TM. For the developing countries as a whole the Lom6 conventions and the GSP have been of the greatest importance; their provisions for the agricultural sector shall therefore be examined here. [] The EC grants unilateral exemption from customs duties and charges to imports of ACP origin (Art. 2 (1) of the agreement) but expressly excluded from this arrangement are the goods which are subject to a common market organization according to Art. 40 or to a special arrangement for EC imports in the framework of the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (Art. 2 (2)). Moreover, the Community has reserved the right to operate safeguards if the application of the agreement gives rise to serious disruptions in an economic area of the Community or one or several member states (Art. 12) 16 .
[] The Lom~ convention provides for a fund for the stabilization of the export earnings from selected products (Stabex). The financial volume of this fund has been raised from EUA 375 mn (for 1975-80) to EUA 550 mn (for 1980-85); the annual allocation has thus been increased from EUA 75 mn to EUA 110 mn. The principles underlying the operation of the system are: Earnings to be balanced for individual products, automatic entitlement to compensation, use of these payments by the recipient state not tied to specific purposes, payments received to be paid back. The least developed countries are exempt from the "replenishment" duty. Recourse to the fund is subject to the products concerned accounting for a certain proportion of exports and the proceeds from their sale declining by at least 6.5%; there are however exceptions also from this rule 17. The Stabex system currently applies to 44 products -amongst them the following agricultural products: groundnuts, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and coconuts.
[] A particularly favourable arrangement has been reached for the sugar producers in the ACP group. Under the sugar agreement concluded as an appendix to the Lom6 I Convention the EC has undertaken to purchase and import certain quantities of sugar at guaranteed prices. This concession for ACP export products does not however constitute a permanent easing of the protectionist agricultural market regime of the EC. Table 2 which summarizes the major EC imports of agricultural products from ACP countries shows that except for sugar the EC has retained in the Lom~ conventions its external protection for the most important products that are subject to market organizations. The German Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation put the situation in the following words: "... only in regard to some products subject to market organizations was the Community unable to jump over its shadow ''19. Through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 2~ the EC accords to the developing countries a preferential treatment in trade with the intention of helping them to increase their export earnings and to quicken their economic growth. This is to be achieved by industrialization in particular; the tariff preferences therefore focus on industrial semi-finished and finished products, corresponding to items 25-99 of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. In addition, the EC permits selected agricultural products (items 1-24) to be imported under this scheme.
While the industrial products covered by the GSP can be imported duty-free, the preference for agricultural products consists for the most part of a tariff cut which in 1971 amounted to four percentage points. In the course of time the EC has made more far-reaching concessions so that now part of the agricultural products can also be imported free of duty 2~. In view of this it may be taken for granted that Table 2 Major EC Imports of Agricultural Products from ACP Countries (in 1977) Value of Imports Share of Total (in EUA'000) Imports from ACP countries (in %) the EC is, within limits, ready to facilitate imports of agricultural products from the ACP states with which it has traditionally close links. The GSP which by now encompasses almost all developing countries however provides hardly any concessions of this kind. In consequence of the EC's agricultural policy and out of consideration for the ACP countries the GSP preferences are much smaller. As far as products subject to market organizations are concerned, the conflict between the objectives with an internal economic bent and those relating to the EC's trade with third countries, referred to in the beginning, has been most certainly decided in favour of seclusion for the internal market 22.
Development Effects
By pursuing this kind of agricultural policy with a relatively high internal price level shielded from the outside world by protectionist measures the EC is preventing an improvement of the world-wide division of labour. It may be presumed that if the EC gave up its protectionist shield, the law of comparative cost advantages would in fact function in such a way as to replace a not inconsiderable part of its agricultural production by imports. Many developing countries could in this case take the place of producers'inside the EC. Products covered by EC market organizations accounted in 1970 after all for about one-third of the agricultural exports from developing countries. The existence of EC market organizations constitutes quite an important handicap for the developing countries as far as their export capacity is concerned because they are thereby deprived of -in part substantialmarketing and specialization opportunities 23. The result under international aspects is sub-optimal factor allocation.
The worsening of their export position has a noticeable retarding effect on the development of the developing countries. For one thing, they have less chance of earning from exports of their agricultural products the foreign exchange which they need to finance their development projects. This is especially true of the countries in which the potential for selffinanced development is curbed primarily by limitations in the foreign exchange field. The detriment to their development chances is all the greater because they cannot expect to close the foreign exchange gap by increased foreign aid in the form of grants.
For another, the developing countries come in this kind of situation under increased pressure to assign to import substitution a higher priority in the selection of sectoral preferences than would be advisable on grounds of factor endowment. This could not only impair the potential market for goods from EC industries in developing countries, it would, besides, force the developing countries to content themselves with a sub-optimal factor allocation in the internal sphere, which would impede the development process.
Special attention should be paid in this context to the possible -in part substantial -negative distributive effects inside developing countries. If developing countries abstain from support for the (export-oriented) agricultural sector and instead promote (importsubstituting) manufacturing industries, the result is often that rural areas are neglected to the benefit of the towns. As clearly shown by many empirical studies, the problem of absolute poverty in the developing countries, which has been assailed so strongly in the last few years, is primarily a rural problem. Selective measures against absolute poverty must therefore focus on the agricultural production. Not only must the production of food for domestic consumption be increased but it should be examined how far an expansion of export-oriented agricultural production could contribute to improved living conditions in rural areas. There would however be no point in this if large economic regions like the ~ EC apply protectionist measures as a shield against the outside world.
The problems broached here are aggravated by the offer of EC surpluses at reduced prices in the world market made possible by the system of export refunds. The EC's agricultural policy thus not only hampers the exports of these products by the developing countries to the EC but exposes them to competition by EC surpluses in the world markets. To dispose of these surpluses in competition with products from other countries -including developing countries -the EC products have to be subsidized. As a consequence the export opportunities of suppliers competing with the 6O EC in third-country markets are being impaired. The EC export subsidies amount in fact to large sums. In 1968/69 the export refunds amounted to DM 47 for each DM 100 Of foreign currency received for exports of selected EC agricultural products to third countries 24. This puts the world market prices of the products concerned under pressure, and the foreign exchange position of competing suppliers is adversely affected.
The EC's agricultural surpluses are also a major determining factor in food aid allocation. The EC provides most of the foodstuffs in question as "bulk supplies", bearing in general the cost of the transport up to the border of the recipient country. The distribution of the foodstuffs is in most cases the concern of the recipient countries. Under development aspects this kind of food aid can have negative effects, especially if continued for any length of time as the EC is tempted to do by the constant surpluses. If food aid is provided indiscriminately for many years, there is a danger that, on the onehand, the government of the recipient country, having become accustomed to it, will relax its own efforts to increase agricultural production and that, on the other hand, competing agricultural products in the recipient country have to be sold at very low prices. This keeps many farmers from producing surplus food for sale. Both these effects lead to increased dependence on agricultural imports whereas in the international discussion it is widely agreed that in the long run the food situation in the developing countries can only be improved by raising the internal production of staple foodstuffs.
Aid in the form of food poses another problem in that the EC has in the past often given too little thought to the dietary customs of the recipients in the developing countries and their facilities for hygiene. The deliveries of powdered milk invite special criticism in this respect.
Taking all things together, the EC should examine [] whether, with all its internal agricultural difficulties, it has really made the fullest use of the opportunities for easing the access of third countries -including in particular the developing countries -to its agricultural market, and [] whether easing the access to this market would not be a more efficacious aid to development than many another bi-or multilateral cooperation programme or project.
24 D. K e b s c h u I I : Agrarpolitik und Entwicklungspolitik der EWG imlnteressenkonflikt (Agricultural policy and development policy of the EEC in the conffict of Interests), quoted from K. K 6 h I e r, op. cit., p. 310.
